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Abstract 
 
While scholars have shown strong and enduring interest in the role of emotions in politics, 
questions remain about the connections between emotions and political intolerance. First, it is 
not clear which emotion (if any) is likely to produce intolerance toward one’s disliked groups, 
with different studies favoring hatred, anger, or fear. Second, it is unclear whether these effects 
of emotion are moderated by sophistication, as some conventional political thought argues. Do 
the less-sophisticated, in other words, rely on emotions when making judgments, therefore being 
less tolerant than sophisticates, who rely on reason? Here, we test both hypotheses using a large 
representative sample of the American population. We find that hatred, anger, and fear are 
significantly but only modestly related to political intolerance. Moreover, the effects of emotions 
on intolerance are not consistently stronger among the unsophisticated. These findings provide 
little support for the conventional assumption that the less sophisticated rely on their emotions in 
making political judgments. 
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You know, to just be grossly generalistic, you could put half of Trump's 
supporters into what I call the basket of deplorables. Right? The racist, sexist, 
homophobic, xenophobic, Islamophobic – you name it. And unfortunately there 
are people like that. And he has lifted them up. He has given voice to their 
websites that used to only have 11,000 people – now 11 million. He tweets and 
retweets their offensive hateful mean-spirited rhetoric. Now, some of those folks 
– they are irredeemable, but thankfully they are not America. 
                  Hillary Clinton  
 
opulist and authoritarian political movements are on the rise across the world. In 
countries as diverse as the United States, Turkey, Hungary, Brazil, and Italy, 
authoritarian-populist leaders or parties are in government. One of the hallmarks of these 
movements is their crass majoritarianism, sometimes associated with a call for minority and 
dissident voices to be silenced, whether by the state or by the very supporters of these 
movements. Thus, it would appear that political tolerance, always the most elusive of democratic 
values, is once again under threat in many democracies. 
A great deal of research has attempted to understand why some citizens extend civil 
rights to groups they dislike, while others do not (see Gibson, 2006, and Sullivan and Hendriks, 
2009). Since intolerance represents a negative, almost instinctive reaction to a threatening 
outgroup, a particularly interesting approach has been to examine the emotional roots of 
intolerance (see for examples, Haas and Cunningham, 2014; Kuklinski, Riggle, Ottati, Schwarz, 
and Wyer, 1991; Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, and Stevens, 2005; Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-
P 
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Morse, and Wood, 1995; Skitka, Bauman, and Mullen, 2004).  
Yet unresolved issues remain in the study of emotion and intolerance. First, which 
emotion (if any) most powerfully drives intolerance? Noting the prominent role played by threat 
in predicting intolerance, some scholars have argued that intolerance is a reaction to fear and 
anxiety (e.g., Marcus et al. 1995). Others have emphasized the role played by anger (Skitka 
2004), which, in intergroup settings, can produce a confrontational and aggressive response to 
target groups (Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000). Yet others have made the case for a unique 
influence of hatred – indeed, Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, and Hirsch-Hoefler (2009) argue that 
hatred is perhaps the most powerful driver of intolerance.  
A second unresolved issue concerns the interplay between emotion and political 
sophistication. While intolerance is often thought to be an emotional reaction to a threatening 
outgroup, tolerance – in contrast – is believed to be largely driven by considered reason, as via a 
“sober second thought” (Gibson 1998). Moreover, Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, and Hirsch-Hoefler 
(2009), for example, argue that hatred does not create intolerance among all citizens; rather, this 
sort of emotional engagement with one’s political opponents seems to most influence those who 
are politically unsophisticated. Various elitist theories of politics posit that because ordinary 
people typically rely on their emotions when making political judgments, intolerance often 
results. Elites, on the other hand, eschew emotional reactions to their opponents; because they 
rely on reason, tolerance is the outcome. Many political psychology scholars (e.g., Marcus, 
Neuman, and MacKuen, 2000) are not so certain that a bright-line distinction can be made 
between emotion and reason, but that has not stopped the search for the emotional determinants 
of political intolerance within the mass public. On its face, the contemporary politics of populism 
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might be understood by this theory. 
Our purpose in this paper is to reconsider the role emotions play in tolerance judgments. 
Using a large representative sample of the American public, the first part of our analysis focuses 
on investigating the emotional determinants of political tolerance. Following extant research, we 
investigate three measures of emotional engagement with political outgroups: hatred, anger, and 
fear. We then turn to the moderating role of political sophistication, under the hypothesis that 
those with little sophistication are more likely to rely upon emotions than those with greater 
sophistication. Contrary to some extant research, we find that emotions play only a limited and 
certainly not dominant role in producing political intolerance. More important than emotions are 
conventional predictors of intolerance, such as threat perceptions. In addition, our analysis 
reveals few significant differences in the importance of emotional engagements between the 
more- and less-sophisticated. Our findings underscore the need for additional research to 
reconcile some fairly fundamental discrepancies in whether, how, and when emotions structure 
political intolerance. We conclude the paper by drawing out the implications of our findings for 
contemporary debates about populism, suggesting that realistic grievances and inter-group 
conflict may play more significant roles in populist politics than is ordinarily thought. 
 
Emotion-Based Theories of Political Intolerance 
Intolerance has long been associated with psychological insecurity and the perception of threat 
(e.g., Gibson, 2006; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus, 1982).1 A particularly interesting – and 
                                               
1 We do not necessarily assume that psychological insecurity and threat perceptions are 
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fairly recent – extension to this classic model is to investigate individuals’ emotional reactions to 
threatening and disliked groups (e.g., Haas and Cunningham, 2014; Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, and 
Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009; Kuklinski, Riggle, Ottati, Schwarz, and Wyer, 1991; Marcus, Sullivan, 
Theiss-Morse, and Stevens, 2005; Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, and Wood, 1995; Skitka, 
Bauman, and Mullen, 2004). Indeed, emotions have been shown to play a particularly important 
role when individuals engage in intergroup evaluations (Mackie, Devos, and Smith, 2000), as is 
most certainly the case for the decision about whether to “put up with” one’s political enemies.  
Yet, even if scholars increasingly agree that intolerance is related to emotional reactions 
to target groups, it is far less clear which emotion is the key to understanding intolerance. Three 
particular emotions have dominated existing research: fear, anger, and hatred. We review 
research on each of these below, before drawing our hypotheses. 
 
Fear 
Fear is typically associated with withdrawal from, rather than with confrontation with, a target 
group (Frijda, Kuipers, and ter Schure, 1989), with the result that fear tends to decrease the 
likelihood of aggression against a group (Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese, 2007; Mackie, Devos, 
and Smith, 2000). Tolerance judgments differ from behavioral aggression however: rather than 
                                               
grounded in emotions. Threat perceptions, in particular, may be a function of an entirely realistic 
analysis of the attributes and capabilities of one’s opponents (e.g., Sullivan et al., 1993; Wang 
and Chen, 2008). Fortunately, our analysis does not require a determination of the sources of 
these intolerance predictors. 
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being behaviors, they are attitudes regarding the extension or withdrawal of permission for a 
disliked group to engage in political activities. Thus, we conjecture that the tendency for fear to 
lead to avoidant behaviors does not in fact imply that this emotion will have only indirect and 
weak effects on tolerance attitudes. 
Indeed, several existing studies show that fear (or an analogue, like anxiety) does in fact 
have a direct, positive influence on intolerance. Skitka et al. (2004) find that fear is positively 
correlated with intolerance, while Marcus et al. (1995) similarly demonstrate that normatively 
threatening experimental vignettes increase anxiety and also intolerance. Other research 
identifies the mechanism that may be at work: Fear begets intolerance because it increases both 
rumination (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen, 2000; Mogg, Mathews, Bird, and Macgregor-
Morris, 1990) and risk aversion (Lerner and Keltner, 2001; Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese, 
2007). Together, these findings suggest that fearful individuals use a more careful, deliberative 
approach when making tolerance judgments. And as Kuklinski et al. (1991) show (but see 
Theiss-Morse, Marcus, and Sullivan, 1993), deliberation can produce greater levels of 
intolerance than can purely affective reactions to disliked groups. As such, we hypothesize that 
fear will have a direct, positive connection with intolerance. 
Anger 
Anger produces a confrontational mindset (Averill, 1983). In intergroup settings, this mindset 
can result in an increased desire to act aggressively against the outgroup (Claassen, 2016; 
Mackie, Devos, and Smith, 2000), as well as in a reduced desire to reconcile (Tam et al., 2007). 
As an emotion of approach, anger spurs individuals to take action against the target of their 
emotions. While this action may include behavioral aggression, it may also include support for 
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another party taking punitive action against the target group (Lerner, Goldberg, and Tetlock, 
1998). For example, Huddy et al. (2007) find that Americans who were angry at Saddam Hussein 
and “terrorists” showed greater support for the Iraq War. It therefore seems likely that 
individuals who are angry at a group would also favor the government restricting that group’s 
civil liberties—that is, they would show greater intolerance toward the group. Indeed, Skitka et 
al. (2004) find anger to be one of the stronger correlates of intolerance, after perceived threat, 
outgroup derogation, and fear. As such, we hypothesize that anger will have a positive and direct 
influence on intolerance.   
 
Hatred 
In the study of intergroup conflict, hatred is often proposed as a unique determinant of hostility 
toward outgroups (e.g., Bar-Tal, 2007; Petersen, 2002; Staub, 2005). Although analyses of the 
dimensionality of emotional experience tend to lump hatred and anger together as, for example, 
“aversion” (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen, 2017), Halperin (2008) has demonstrated the 
distinctiveness of these emotions (see also Smith and Mackie, 2005). Moreover, since tolerance 
requires antipathy toward the object of the tolerance (one cannot “put up with” that which one 
does not reject and dislike), antipathy and hatred would appear particularly likely to be 
associated with intolerance.  
Indeed, this is the argument proposed by Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, and Hirsch-Hoefler 
(2009). Using survey data from Israel, they test the effects of fear, anger, and hatred on 
intolerance. They find that while fear and anger show weak and insignificant effects, hatred 
shows a strong positive association with intolerance. As they conclude, “hatred is key to the 
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understanding of political intolerance” (2009, p. 97). We similarly hypothesize that hatred will 
have a positive, direct effect on intolerance. 
In sum, we examine the effects of three particular emotions on intolerance: fear, anger, 
and hatred. We treat these emotions as distinct, as do a number of analysts (e.g., Halperin, 2008; 
Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, and Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009; Mackie, Devos, and Smith, 2000; Smith and 
Mackie, 2005). We recognize that others view anger and hatred as part of single syndrome of 
aversive emotional engagement (e.g., Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen, 2017), and as a 
consequence Online Appendix D reproduces our entire analysis using an index that combines 
hatred and anger (we retain fear as a distinct emotion). The advantages of using the three 
emotions as separate independent variables include the ability to consider 1) whether some 
emotions are more consequential for intolerance than others, 2) whether some emotions are more 
relevant to those low in political sophistication than others, while 3) still allowing us to assess 
how much political intolerance is driven by emotions in toto. Except for a few minor details, 
which analytical strategy we employ has few implications for our substantive conclusions.  
 
The Moderating Effect of Political Sophistication 
Scholars further hypothesize that political sophistication moderates the relationship between 
emotions and intolerance (e.g., Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, and Hirsch-Hoefler 2009, 99). In 
particular, many argue that sophistication reduces the effects of emotions such that sophisticated 
individuals will be less likely to use emotions in their attitude-formation and decision-making 
processes. This hypothesis, of course, resembles the views of the framers of the American 
Constitution, who thought that the masses often made political judgments on the basis of their 
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“passions.”  
For instance, some existing research (Rahn, 2000; Zinni, Mattei, and Rhodebeck, 1997) 
shows that emotions have a stronger effect on public opinion among the unsophisticated. 
Researchers interpret this finding as an extension of the well-established sophistication-
interaction hypothesis (Delli-Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock, 1991), 
which posits that core beliefs and values have a stronger effect on public opinion among the 
sophisticated. Indeed, in a similar fashion, scholars have long believed that tolerance is mainly a 
product of reason, and that intolerance – on the other hand – follows when passions dominate 
(Theiss-Morse, Marcus, and Sullivan, 1993). To the extent that reason is the province of the 
sophisticated, this claim supports the hypothesis that sophistication will dampen the effects of 
emotions on intolerance.  
Conversely, other research suggests that sophistication may in fact increase emotional 
linkages with intolerance. Rudolph, Gangl, and Stevens (2000) show that emotional engagement 
only produces political involvement when political efficacy (a correlate of sophistication) is 
high. And Lodge and Taber (2005) find that sophisticated subjects are more likely to respond 
emotionally to various political actors and groups because they have larger, more connected 
stores of political information. Hence, there are good reasons to expect that the links between 
their emotions and their political attitudes and behaviors are especially strong among 
sophisticated individuals. 
The results of Rudolph, Gangl, and Stevens (2000) and those of Lodge and Taber (2005) 
also suggest that sophistication may play a more complex role with respect to the emotion-
intolerance link. Indeed, the findings of Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, and Hirsch-Hoefler (2009) 
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point toward this complexity: Although sophistication decreases the effects of hatred on 
intolerance, sophistication instead flips the direction of the effect of anger, leading anger to have 
negative consequences for intolerance among the unsophisticated but positive consequences 
among the sophisticated.  
Given this contradictory and confusing literature, we aim to retest this sophistication-
moderation hypothesis using new data. We find more persuasive the argument that sophistication 
dampens the influence of emotion on intolerance, so we hypothesize that sophistication will 
reduce the effects of all three negative emotions on intolerance. We expect, in other words, to 
observe negative interaction terms between sophistication on the one hand, and anger, hatred, 
and fear, on the other.  
 
Data and Measures 
Data 
The data upon which we rely for this analysis are known as the Freedom and Tolerance Surveys 
(FATS). These surveys, conducted from 2007 through 2011, use a generally constant 
methodology, the same survey firm, and a largely invariant survey instrument. The interviews 
were conducted on the telephone (with cell phone subsamples added in the 2010 and 2011 
surveys). The samples were randomly selected from the population of phone owners 18 years old 
and older (for further details see Online Appendix A). Because earlier analyses of these data 
have shown no significant change within the time period of the surveys (“previous work by the 
authors”), we collapse them into a single database of approximately 4,000 respondents.  
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Dependent Variable: Political Intolerance 
The widely-used Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1982) least-liked approach to measuring 
political intolerance begins by querying the respondents about their feelings toward a varied list 
of groups selected by the researcher but supplemented by the respondents’ own nominations of 
other groups. Table 1 reports the descriptive results from the FATS data. 
[PLACE TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 According to these surveys, the Ku Klux Klan is the most disliked of these groups, with 
more than two-thirds of the respondents naming members of the Klan as their most or third-most 
(explained below) disliked group. Still, other groups are also highly disliked: A majority of 
Americans feel very coldly toward militarists, atheists, radical Muslims, and U.S. communists. 
Only a single group—conservatives—attracts a mean feeling thermometer score that is warmer 
than the midpoint on the 101-point scale.  
 While some scholars have focused primarily on asking their respondents a series of 
tolerance questions about their most disliked group, others have expanded their questioning by 
asking about other highly disliked groups (e.g., Gibson and Gouws, 2003). In the case of the 
FATS surveys, the respondents were randomly assigned to be asked the tolerance questions 
either about their most disliked group or about their third-most disliked group. The logic of this 
approach is that greater variability is introduced by asking about less extreme but still highly 
disliked groups, even if this requires that the status of the group be controlled for in subsequent 
analyses. 
 Later, in FATS, the respondents were asked about whether these groups ought to be 
allowed to give speeches, run candidates for public office, and hold public demonstrations. These 
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make for valid measures of political tolerance because speaking, seeking public office, and 
demonstrating are all rights that democracies must allow for all political points-of-view (e.g., 
Dahl, 1971). Table 2 reports the respondents’ replies. 
[PLACE TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 The American people are more or less evenly divided on whether these highly disliked 
groups ought to be afforded their civil liberties. This division is most obvious when it comes to 
tolerance of the most disliked group—for instance, 49.4% would allow a speech by the group, 
while 43.1% would not. For the other highly disliked group, tolerance is more often reported 
than intolerance, although about one-third of the respondents would not tolerate any of the 
activities by this group (data not shown). As is often the case, limited variability in tolerance 
exists across the three civil liberties activities.  
 We created a combined index of intolerance from these three indicators. The item-set has 
strong psychometric properties, with relatively high reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = .75), strong 
unidimensionality (the eigenvalue of the second factor extracted in a Common Factor Analysis = 
.64), and roughly equal validity of the indicators (as shown by the approximately equivalent 
factor loadings of the items on the first unrotated factor). Because a simple summated index is 
very strongly correlated with the factor score from the first unrotated factor, it will serve as the 
dependent variable for our analysis. We scored this index (and all other variables in this analysis) 
to range from 0 to 1. 
 
Independent Variables 
Following convention (e.g., Gibson, 2006; Erisen and Kentmen-Cin, 2017) and earlier analyses 
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of these data (“previous work by the authors”), we created indices of three subdimensions of 
threat perceptions: sociotropic threat, egocentric threat, and perceptions of group power. 
Sociotropic threat was measured by two items, one asking whether the group is “not dangerous 
to society” versus “dangerous to society,” and the other asking the respondents to rate the group 
as “not dangerous to the normal lives of people” versus “dangerous to the normal lives of 
people.” Egocentric threat perceptions were also measured by two items: whether the group 
would or would not “reduce your personal political freedom,” and whether the group would or 
would not “if they gained power, affect your personal security.” Finally, group power was 
measured with three questions: whether the group is “likely to gain a lot of power in the United 
States” versus unlikely to do so; whether the group is “unlikely to affect how well my family and 
I live” versus likely to do so; and whether the group is “powerful” or not. The measures are 
positively intercorrelated (i.e., if one type of threat is perceived, the other types are also likely to 
be perceived), but not very strongly (with the bivariate correlations ranging from .25 to .32). 
Across all groups, intolerance is correlated with sociotropic threat at .26, with egocentric threat 
at .16, and with perceived group power at .03. In a multivariate equation, all three threat 
predictors are significantly related to intolerance, although, as seen in earlier research (e.g., 
Gibson and Gouws, 2003), sociotropic threat perceptions are by far the strongest predictors. 
Together, the three threat measures account for 8% of the variance in political intolerance.  
The analysis of (“previous work by the authors”) provides a basic model of the predictors 
of tolerance that we find useful.2 However, we add a few additional variables to that equation in 
order to more fully incorporate group attributes into our analysis. These include perceptions of 
                                               
2 See Online Appendix B for a discussion of our measurement of these various concepts.  
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the degree of commitment of the group to democratic values and norms (e.g., Petersen et al., 
2011), whether the respondents reported that they actually know a member of their disliked 
group, and fixed effects for each of the groups in the analysis  (as “previous work by the authors” 
suggest).  
 
Emotional Engagement with the Group 
We asked the respondents to rate their most disliked group or their third-most disliked group in 
terms of three emotions: anger, hatred, and fear. Their responses were collected on a scale 
ranging from 0 to 10 (which was then converted for our analysis to range from 0 to 1). The mean 
scores showed that the respondents expressed more anger toward the groups than either fear or 
hatred, and they also expressed more hatred than fear. Nearly 30% (29.7%) of the respondents 
selected the most extreme response category for anger, while 18.1% and 15.3% scored at the 
extremes for fear and hatred, respectively. Conversely, considering the lowest points on the 
emotional engagement score, the percentages are 24.1, 16.8, and 12.2, for fear, hatred, and anger, 
respectively.  
We draw two conclusions from these data. First, considerable variability exists among the 
respondents in their degrees of emotional engagement with the group they selected as highly 
disliked. Second, anger toward the group is more common than fear and especially more 
common than hatred.  
The ratings on the three aspects of emotion are moderately intercorrelated, with an 
average of the Pearson correlation coefficients of .41. However, anger and hatred are somewhat 
more strongly related (r = .56), and fear and hatred are somewhat more weakly related (r = .33). 
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From these correlations, we conclude that emotions are interconnected but are far from 
redundant.3  
 
Analysis 
Table 3 reports our baseline analysis of the predictors of intolerance. The first conclusion we 
draw from the model in the table is that it accounts for a quite considerable amount of the 
variance in levels of intolerance—approaching one-half. Significant individual predictors of 
intolerance are political sophistication, dogmatism, a preference for order over liberty, 
sociotropic threat perceptions, and level of education. The other aspects of threat perceptions 
have little if any influence on intolerance (and some of the observed signs are not even in the 
hypothesized direction). While the equation reveals quite a number of highly significant 
predictors of tolerance, few of the relationships are of much magnitude. For instance, knowing 
members of the disliked group only slightly decreases intolerance, while perceiving the group to 
be undemocratic just marginally increases intolerance. 
[PLACE TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
We also note that whether the group is most disliked or is another highly disliked group 
                                               
3 As discussed above, there are both theoretical and empirical reasons to treat anger and 
hatred as indicators of the same latent concept, which some refer to as “aversion” (Marcus, 
Neuman, and MacKuen, 2017). Consequently, we report in Appendix D a parallel analysis that 
tests the effects of fear and an aversion index derived from combining hatred and anger. The 
results of that analysis strongly reinforce the main substantive conclusions of this paper.  
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has some slight connection to intolerance, even in this fairly comprehensive model. Lastly, we 
observe that adding the group dummy variables to the base model raises the explained variance 
by 5 percentage points, which is, of course, a highly significant increase (data not shown). This 
indicates that there are still group-specific components of intolerance that are not captured by 
this reasonably well-specified model.4  
Finally, we observe a quite substantial relationship between political sophistication and 
political intolerance, with the more sophisticated expressing significantly less intolerance. This is 
a direct effect of sophistication, which is different from the interactive hypothesis that suggests 
that the less sophisticated rely more on their emotions when developing a response to their 
disliked political enemies.  
 
Do Anger, Fear, and Hatred Stoke Intolerance? 
As we hypothesized, each of the three emotional reactions has a significant positive connection 
to levels of intolerance. However, all these coefficients, while significant, are fairly small 
(although we do acknowledge that the equation represents a reasonably comprehensive model of 
                                               
4 Removing the group fixed effects from Table 3 produces only very minor changes to 
the findings. Fear loses its statistical significance, but the regression coefficient remains almost 
the same. The effect of group power becomes slightly greater and is statistically significant, 
while the effect of sociotropic threat increases slightly. Generally, however, the inclusion or 
exclusion of the group fixed effects in Table 3 has practically no substantive implications.  
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political intolerance).5 In addition, contrary to the findings of some earlier research, in our 
analysis hatred does not have a stronger connection with intolerance than does anger or fear. If 
anything, our results suggest that, among Americans, anger is the most important emotional 
pathway to intolerance.6  
Moreover, although we find that all three emotions play some role in shaping intolerance 
judgments, all three emotions are nevertheless weaker predictors of intolerance than are the 
classic wellsprings of intolerance, such as sociotropic threats and dogmatic orientations. Even 
anger, the strongest emotional correlate of intolerance in our data, has a significantly weaker 
effect on intolerance (in absolute value terms) than dogmatism, support for order over liberty, 
and sophistication (for all comparisons, p < .001). Additionally, the coefficients of hatred and 
fear are weaker than the coefficients of sociotropic threat and education (for fear, p < .001 for 
both variables; for hatred, p = .001 when compared with sociotropic threat and p = .004 when 
                                               
5 Although anger and hatred are correlated at r = .56, the equation reported in Table 3 
does not suffer from issues of multicollinearity. The variance inflation factors (VIF) are below 3 
across all predictors. 
6 We conducted tests of the null hypothesis that the coefficients do not differ for each of 
the three pairs of emotion coefficients. We found that the effect of anger is significantly different 
from that of fear (p = .015) but not from that of hatred (p = .190). The coefficients for hatred and 
fear do not differ (p = .394). We conclude from this that anger has a somewhat stronger effect on 
intolerance than does fear, but that the effect of anger is not necessarily stronger than the effect 
of hatred.  
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compared with education). Thus, regarding the relative importance of the emotions, our findings 
clearly show that emotions make a significant but modest contribution to explaining political 
intolerance.7  
 
The Moderating Effects of Political Sophistication  
We use a measure of political knowledge as our indicator of political sophistication. In Table 4, 
we report an analysis that incorporates the interactions of sophistication and the three emotions 
within a single integrated equation. Because our basic model of political intolerance (shown in 
Table 3, above) is quite comprehensive, we only report in Table 4 the results of the equation that 
pertain to the interactions. However, these coefficients are drawn from the full equations (results 
of which are available upon request from the authors). 
[PLACE TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Our first important finding is that sophistication has no significant interaction with 
hatred. Moreover, although we are reluctant to treat our insignificant interactive coefficient as 
                                               
7 In analysis presented and discussed more fully in Appendix D, we used a combined 
index of aversion (i.e., hatred and anger), as well as fear. First, we find that both fear and 
aversion are positively and significantly related to intolerance. Second, the impact of aversion 
(hatred/anger) is stronger than the impact of fear, and is significantly stronger than the impact of 
hatred and anger when these are treated as separate measures. Third, the influence of aversion is 
far from dominant, with predictors such as sociotropic threat, dogmatism, and sophistication, 
having the same or larger consequences for producing political intolerance. 
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distinguishable from zero, the sign of the coefficient points toward sophistication actually 
increasing the effects of hatred on intolerance. This finding runs contrary to that of earlier 
research by Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, and Hirsch-Hoefler (2009).8  
Our data also reveal that anger and sophistication have a negative and significant 
interaction relationship. As the marginal effects plot in Figure 1 shows, anger, as hypothesized, 
increases intolerance only among those with very low levels of sophistication. Once 
sophistication reaches a level of about .33 on the 0-to-1 scale, the effects of anger are no longer 
significant. Our data therefore indicate that anger is significantly related to intolerance for about 
28% of the sample (those with relatively low sophistication), and is not related to intolerance for 
the remaining roughly 72% of the sample that is somewhat or more sophisticated.9  
[PLACE FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Finally, we turn to the emotion of fear. Our data indicate no significant fear-
sophistication interaction. For neither the less sophisticated nor the more sophisticated does fear 
                                               
8 When sophistication is 0 (indicating the least sophisticated), the estimated coefficient 
for hatred is .02. When sophistication is at its highest point (1), the coefficient is .08 (.02 + .06). 
We reiterate, however, that the proper inference from the hypothesis test is that the slope of the 
interaction term is not distinguishable from zero.  
9 In Appendix D, we replicate this moderation analysis, replacing the separate measures 
of anger and hatred with the combined aversion index. This analysis supports our conclusion that 
the influence of emotion does not vary by levels of political sophistication: neither the fear nor 
the aversion interaction terms are statistically significant. 
 
  
-19- 
contribute much to political intolerance.  
These results differ considerably from those found by Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, and 
Hirsch-Hoefler (2009), who also examine the interactions between sophistication and the 
emotions of fear, anger, and hatred. At conventional levels of statistical significance, they 
generally find hatred, but not anger (and probably not fear), to have a significant interaction with 
sophistication; we find anger, but neither hatred nor fear, to have significant interactions. Our 
marginal effects analysis reveals that anger increases intolerance when sophistication is quite 
low, and that even at moderate levels of sophistication, the relationship with anger evaporates.10   
 
                                               
10 A caveat to these moderation results is the potential multicollinearity that could arise 
due to the correlation between the constitutive and the interaction terms in the regression model. 
The VIFs for the interaction terms of sophistication and anger (11.0), fear (6.2), and hatred (9.4) 
are particularly noticeable. Rescaling to zero and/or standardizing predictors are common 
techniques for dealing with non-essential multicollinearity that occurs merely due to the scaling 
or nonzero mean of predictor variables, which is often the case in continuous-by-continuous 
interaction models (Marquandt, 1980; Shieh, 2010). If we mean-center and standardize our 
variables, all VIFs fall below 3. The interactions between the standardized versions of anger, 
fear, hatred, and sophistication yield identical results as above (equations not shown). Hence, we 
have confidence in the conclusion that the effect of anger is to some small degree moderated by 
sophistication, while the effects of fear and hatred are not. 
  
-20- 
Discussion and Concluding Comments 
Our results demonstrate that negative emotional reactions to disliked groups increase the 
intensity of intolerance toward those groups. Since intolerance represents a negative, almost 
instinctive reaction to a threatening outgroup, this is not a surprising finding. However, in 
contrast to some extant studies (e.g., Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, and Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009), we 
find that the role played by emotion is fairly limited. Our findings certainly do not agree with 
Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, and Hirsch-Hoefler (2009) that hatred is the “key” to understanding 
intolerance. Although hatred, fear, and anger all increase intolerance, their effects are noticeably 
weaker than such well-established determinants of intolerance as psychological insecurity and 
sociotropic threat.  
The emotional well-springs of intolerance nevertheless remain a potentially fruitful 
avenue for future research. Researchers might consider experimentally manipulating emotions to 
test their causal effects on intolerance, as has been accomplished so profitably in the study of 
intergroup conflict (e.g., Mackie, Devos, and Smith, 2000). It is also worth considering whether 
additional emotions beyond fear, anger, and hatred – such as disgust and contempt (e.g., Tausch 
et al., 2011) – should be examined. 
The disparity between our findings and those of Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, and Hirsch-
Hoefler (2009) raises the issue of the role played by context in intolerance, and in particular, in 
how threats (and possibly emotional reactions) vary considerably across national contexts. It may 
well be that a key difference between the contexts of these two studies is the degree to which 
hatred characterizes Israelis’ feelings toward their political opponents. If hatred is in fact a more 
extreme form of anger, and if hatred is not widespread in the U.S., then it would be reasonable 
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that anger has the dominant influence in the U.S. whereas hated dominates in Israel. Going much 
further with this argument, however, takes us beyond the scope of our U.S.-based data. Future 
research would profit from studying how contextual factors across societies affect the groups 
selected as most disliked, the degree of inter-group emotional engagement, and, ultimately, 
political intolerance (e.g., Peffley, Hutchison, and Shamir, 2015). 
Our analysis also suggests that the conventional hypothesis that the less sophisticated rely 
on emotions in making political judgments while the sophisticated rely on reason is much too 
simplistic to warrant much further consideration. Most likely, all political judgments reflect both 
emotion and reason (assuming one accepts any sort of distinction between emotion and reason). 
Classical motivated reasoning, for instance, often begins with affective engagement with stimuli 
that have very little, if any, grounding in reason (e.g., the attractiveness of people). According to 
the theory, this initial stage of information-processing structures, if not dominates, subsequent 
conscious reasoning. The politically less sophisticated hold no monopoly over the use of emotion 
in producing political intolerance. And while intolerance can arise from simple emotional 
appraisals, it can also be the result of considered thought, as research from Israel and Taiwan on 
elite intolerance has shown (e.g., Sullivan et al., 1993; Wang and Chen, 2008).   
The study of political intolerance shows signs of becoming a great deal more invigorated 
than it has been in the past, owing partly to theoretical advances and partly to the growing 
menace of political intolerance in many parts of the world. But the etiology of intolerance is 
complicated; indeed, many of the enigmas Gibson identified in 2006 remain unsolved today. 
And if we are correct about the role that context plays in producing intolerance, even more 
complicated models may be required. At a minimum, we think it would clearly be a mistake to 
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assume that intolerance is only or even primarily generated by emotional engagement with one’s 
political foes. It would also be unwise to assume that only the unsophisticated rely on emotions 
when making political judgments. Unfortunately, in today’s politics, it seems that social 
scientists who hope to eradicate or control political intolerance still have a large research agenda 
on their hands.   
 
 
  
  
-23- 
References 
Averill, James R. 1983. “Studies on Anger and Aggression: Implications for Theories of 
Emotion.” American Psychologist 38(11): 1145–1160. 
Bar-Tal, Daniel. 2007. “Societal-Psychological Foundations of Intractable Conflicts.” American 
Behavioral Scientist 50: 1430–53. 
Claassen, Christopher. 2016. “Group Entitlement, Anger and Participation in Intergroup 
Violence.” British Journal of Political Science 46(1): 127–148. 
Dahl, Robert A. 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
Delli-Carpini, Michael X., and Scott Keeter. 1996. What Americans Know about Politics and 
Why it Matters. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Erisen, Cenzig, and Cigdem Kentmen-Cin. 2017. “Tolerance and Perceived Threat Toward 
Muslim Immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands.” European Union Politics 18(1): 
3–26.  
Frijda, Nico H., Peter Kuipers, and Elizabeth ter Schure. 1989. “Relations among Emotion, 
Appraisal and Action Tendency.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 57(2): 
212–228. 
Gibson, James L. 2006. “Enigmas of Intolerance: Fifty Years after Stouffer’s Communism, 
Conformity, and Civil Liberties.” Perspectives on Politics 4(1): 21–34. 
Gibson, James L. 1998. “A Sober Second Thought: An Experiment in Persuading Russians to 
Tolerate.” American Journal of Political Science 42 (#3, July): 819-850. 
Gibson, James L., and Amanda Gouws. 2003. Overcoming Intolerance in South Africa: 
  
-24- 
Experiments in Political Persuasion. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Haas, Ingrid Johnsen, and William A. Cunningham. 2014. “The Uncertainty Paradox: Perceived 
Threat Moderates the Effect of Uncertainty on Political Tolerance.” Political Psychology 
35(2): 291–302. 
Halperin, Eran. 2008. “Group-Based Hatred in Intractable Conflict in Israel.” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 52(5): 713–736. 
Halperin, Eran, Daphna Canetti-Nisim, and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler. 2009. “The Central Role of 
group-Based Hatred as an Emotional Antecedent of Political Intolerance: Evidence from 
Israel.” Political Psychology 30(1): 93–123. 
Huddy, Leonie, Stanley Feldman, and Erin Cassese. 2007. “On the Distinct Political Effects of 
Anxiety and Anger.” In The Affect Effect: The Dynamics of Emotion in Political Thinking 
and Behavior, edited by W. Russel Neuman, George E. Marcus, Ann N. Crigler, and 
Michael Mackuen, 202–230. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Kuklinski, James H., Ellen Riggle, Victor Ottati, Norbert Schwarz, and Robert S. Wyer Jr. 1991. 
“The Cognitive and Affective Bases of Political Tolerance Judgments.” American 
Journal of Political Science 35(1): 1–27. 
Lerner, Jennifer S., and Dacher Keltner. 2001. “Fear, Anger and Risk.” Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology 81(1): 146–159. 
Lerner, Jennifer S., Julie H. Goldberg, and Philip E. Tetlock. 1998. “Sober Second Thought: The 
Effects of Accountability, Anger and Authoritarianism on Attributions of 
Responsibility.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 24(6): 563–574. 
Lodge, Milton, and Charles S. Taber. 2005. “The Automaticity of Affect for Political Leaders, 
  
-25- 
Groups, and Issues: An Experimental Test of the Hot Cognition Hypothesis.” Political 
Psychology 26(3): 455–482. 
Mackie, Diane M., Thierry Devos, and Eliot R. Smith. 2000. “Intergroup Emotions: Explaining 
Offensive Actions in an Intergroup Context.” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 79(4): 602–616. 
Marcus, George E., W. Russell Neuman, and Michael Mackuen. 2000. Affective Intelligence and 
Political Judgment. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Marcus, George E., W. Russell Neuman, and Michael B. MacKuen. 2017. “Measuring 
Emotional Response: Comparing Alternative Approaches to Measurement.” Political 
Science Research and Methods 5(4): 733–754. 
Marcus, George E., John L. Sullivan, Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, and Daniel Stevens. 2005. “The 
Emotional Foundation of Political Cognition: The Impact of Extrinsic Anxiety on the 
Formation of Political Tolerance Judgments.” Political Psychology 26(6): 949–963. 
Marcus, George E., John L. Sullivan, Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, and Sandra L. Wood. 1995. With 
Malice Toward Some: How People Make Civil Liberties Judgments. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Marquandt, Donald W. 1980. “Comment: You Should Standardize the Predictor Variables in 
your Regression Models.” Journal of the American Statistical Association 75(369): 87–
91. 
Mogg, Karin, Andrew Mathews, Carol Bird, and Rosanne Macgregor-Morris. 1990. “Effects of 
Stress and Anxiety on the Processing of Threat Stimuli.” Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 59(6): 1230–1237. 
  
-26- 
Peffley, Mark, Marc L. Hutchison, and Michal Shamir. 2015. “The Impact of Persistent 
Terrorism on Political Tolerance: Israel, 1980 to 2011.” American Political Science 
Review 109(4): 817–832. 
Petersen, Roger D. 2002. Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in 
Twentieth Century Eastern Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Petersen, Michael, Rune Slothuus, Rune Stubager, and Lise Togeby. 2011. “Freedom for All? 
The Strength and Limits of Political Tolerance.” British Journal of Political Science 
41(3): 581–597. 
Rahn, Wendy M. 2000. “Affect as Information: The Role of Public Mood in Political 
Reasoning.” In Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice, and the Bounds of Rationality, 
edited by Arthur Lupia, Matthew D. McCubbins, and Samuel Popkin, 130–150. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Rudolph, Thomas J., Amy Gangl, and Dan Stevens. 2000. “The Effects of Efficacy and 
Emotions on Campaign Involvement.” Journal of Politics 62(4): 1189–1197. 
Shieh, Gwowen. 2010. “On the Misconception of Multicollinearity in Detection of Moderating 
Effects: Multicollinearity is not Always Detrimental.” Multivariate Behavioral 
Research 45(3): 483–507. 
Skitka, Linda J., Christopher W. Bauman, and Elizabeth Mullen. 2004. “Political Tolerance and 
Coming to Psychological Closure Following the September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attacks: 
An Integrative Approach.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 30(6): 743–756. 
Staub, Ervin. 2005. “The Origins and Evolution of Hate, With Notes on Prevention.” In The 
Psychology of Hate, ed. Robert J. Sternberg. Washington, DC: American Psychological 
  
-27- 
Association, pp. 51–66. 
Smith, Eliot R., and Diane M. Mackie. 2005. “Aggression, Hatred, and Other Emotions.” In On 
the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years after Allport, John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, and 
Laurie A. Rudman, eds. Malden, MA: Blackwell, pp. 359–376. 
Sniderman, Paul M., Richard A. Brody, and Philip E. Tetlock. 1991. Reasoning and Choice: 
Explorations in Political Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Sullivan, John L., and Henriët Hendriks. 2009. “Public Support for Civil Liberties Pre- and Post-
9/11.” Annual Review of Law and Social Science 5: 375–391. 
Sullivan, John L., James E. Piereson, and George E. Marcus. 1982. Political Tolerance and 
American Democracy.  Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Sullivan, John L., Pat Walsh, Michal Shamir, David G. Barnum, and James L. Gibson. 1993. 
“Why Politicians are More Tolerant: Selective Recruitment and Socialization Among 
Political Elites in Britain, Israel, New Zealand and the United States.” British Journal of 
Political Science 23(1): 51–76. 
Tam, Tania, Miles Hewstone, Ed Cairns, Nicole Tausch, Greg Maio, and Jared Kenworthy. 
2007. “The Impact of Intergroup Emotions on Forgiveness in Northern Ireland.” Group 
Processes and Intergroup Relations 10(1): 119–136. 
Tausch, Nicole, Russell Spears, Rim Saab, Julia C. Becker, Oliver Christ, Purnima Singh, and 
Roomana N. Siddiqui. 2011. “Explaining Radical Group Behavior: Developing Emotion 
and Effi- cacy Routes to Normative and Nonnormative Collective Action.” Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 101(1): 129–48. 
Theiss-Morse, Elizabeth, George E. Marcus, and John L. Sullivan. 1993. “Passion and Reason in 
  
-28- 
Political Life.” In Reconsidering the Democratic Public, edited by George E. Marcus and 
Russell L. Hanson, 249-272. University Park, PA: Penn State Press. 
Wang, T. Y., and Lu-huei Chen. 2008. “Political Tolerance in Taiwan: Democratic Elitism in a 
Polity Under Threat.” Social Science Quarterly 89(3): 780–801.  
Zinni, Frank P., Franco Mattei, and Laurie A. Rhodebeck. 1997. “The Structure of Attitudes 
Toward Groups: A Comparison of Experts and Novices.” Political Research Quarterly 
50(3): 595–626. 
 
 
 
  
  
-29- 
Figure 1. The Marginal Effect of Anger on Political Intolerance Across Degrees of Political 
Sophistication 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 
The confidence bands represent 95% confidence intervals. The histogram reports the 
frequency distribution of levels of political sophistication.  
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Table 1. The Distribution of Group Affect, FATS, 2007-2011 
Group 
Group Affect (Feeling Thermometer) 
% Most 
Disliked 
% 
Among 
Three 
Most 
Disliked 
% 
Disliked 
Very 
Mucha Mean 
Std. 
Dev. N 
       
Conservatives 7.0 53.8 22.9 4,084 .5 2.0 
Christian fundamentalists 12.8 48.5 26.1 4,086 1.5 7.2 
Liberals 11.3 48.3 23.6 4,088 .8 3.9 
Gay rights activists 22.9 45.3 30.6 4,079 1.9 9.4 
Anti-abortion activists 35.1 37.1 33.2 4,083 1.6 14.6 
Pro-abortion activists 39.2 30.9 33.3 3,993 6.2 19.4 
Communists 50.4 26.1 24.7 4,086 4.8 25.9 
Radical Muslims 56.0 20.3 23.7 4,068 14.2 39.5 
Atheists 64.9 16.9 24.7 3,690b 10.6 36.8 
Militarists 77.7 10.6 20.1 4,092 15.1 42.8 
Members of the Ku Klux Klan 84.1 7.5 17.0 4,089 35.8 69.5 
 
Notes:  
a “Disliked Very Much” is defined as affect thermometer scores of 10 degrees or lower toward the 
group. Percentages are computed from the valid responses, which include “don’t know” responses 
but exclude refusals to answer. The number of observations for the least-liked questions is 4,066. 
Groups are sorted in order of decreasing mean affect. 
 b The survey design in 2008 included a split-ballot structure on the question about atheists, resulting 
in only one-half of the sample in 2008 receiving the same question wording as in the surveys of 2007, 
2009, 2010, and 2011. To ensure consistency in this measure, we exclude respondents who received 
a different wording of the question in 2008. 
Source: Freedom and Tolerance Surveys, 2007-2011.  
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Table 2. Political Tolerance, Least-Liked Groups, 2007-2011 
 
  Political Tolerance  
  Percentage    
  Intolerant Undecided Tolerant Mean Std. Dev. N 
 
Most-Disliked Group       
 Allow Speech 43.1 7.5 49.4 3.0 1.4 2,073 
 Not Ban From Running for 
Office 44.2 7.9 47.8 2.9 1.4 2,067 
 Allow Rallies 47.2 9.7 43.1 2.8 1.3 2,067 
 Tolerance Index – – – 2.9 1.1 2,069 
  
Another Highly Disliked Group      
 Allow Speech 30.1 11.1 58.8 3.3 1.3 2,058 
 Not Ban From Running for 
Office 35.9 11.6 52.5 3.2 1.4 2,057 
 Allow Rallies 37.0 11.5 51.5 3.1 1.3 2,058 
 Tolerance Index – – – 3.2 1.1 2,059 
 
Notes: 
The percentages are calculated on the basis of collapsing the five-point Likert response set 
(e.g., “strongly support” and “support” responses are combined). The means and standard 
deviations are calculated on the uncollapsed distributions. Higher mean scores indicate more 
political tolerance. Note that the respondents were randomly assigned to be asked the 
tolerance questions on either their most disliked group or another highly disliked group.  
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Table 3. A Fully Specified Model of Political Intolerance 
  
Type of Predictor/Indicator r b s.e. β 
 
 Anger toward the group .22 .08*** .01 .09 
 Fear of the group .16 .03** .01 .04 
 Hatred of the group .19 .05*** .01 .06 
  Group is most (versus 3rd-most) disliked .13 .04*** .01 .06 
  Sociotropic threat .26 .11*** .02 .12 
  Egocentric threat .03 .03 .01 .03 
  Group power .17 −.01 .02 −.01 
  Perception that group is undemocratic .06 .04*** .01 .05 
  Knows group member −.15 −.05*** .01 −.06 
  Order preferred to liberty .37 .19*** .02 .15 
  Support for the rule of law −.21 −.06* .02 −.04 
  Dogmatism .38 .21*** .02 .17 
  Political sophistication −.37 −.17*** .01 −.20 
  Ideological identity (liberal = high) −.10 −.02 .02 −.02 
  Partisan identity (Democrat = high) .04 .02 .01 .02 
  Religious attendance .09 .02 .01 .02 
  Born-again .16 .01 .01 .02 
  Female −.16 −.03*** .01 −.06 
  Level of education −.30 −.10*** .01 −.11 
  Owns home −.08 .02 .01 .03 
  Age .03 .04* .02 .03 
  Black .11 .04*** .01 .05 
  Hispanic .10 .04*** .01 .04 
  Group dummy variables  Yes   
       
  Intercept  .24*** .03  
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  Standard Deviation – Dependent Variable  .28   
  Standard Error of Estimate  .21   
  R2  .42***   
  N  3,748   
 
Notes:  
See Online Appendix C for information on the distributions of each of these variables.  
 
Unstandardized regression coefficients and R2:      *** p < .001       ** p < .01       * p < .05   
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Table 4. The Moderating Effects of Emotions and Political Sophistication on Intolerance 
    
Type of Predictor/Indicator b s.e. β 
    
  Anger toward the group .12*** .02 .15 
  Fear of the group .00 .02 .00 
  Hatred of the group .02 .02 .02 
        Political sophistication  −.16*** .03 −.19 
     
 Anger × Sophistication  −.10* .04 −.10 
 Fear × Sophistication  .06 .03 .06 
 Hatred × Sophistication  .06 .04 .05 
      
  Intercept .24*** .04  
  Standard Deviation – Dependent Variable .28   
  Standard Error of Estimate .21   
  R2 .43***   
  N 3,748   
     
Notes: 
These results are from supplementing the equation reported in Table 3 (above) with interaction terms 
for each of the three emotions interacted with political sophistication. The coefficients reported here 
pertain only to the emotions, political sophistication, and their interactions.  
 
Unstandardized regression coefficients and R2:      *** p < .001       ** p < .01       * p < .05   
 
 
 
 
